Khaldoon al-Mubarak: the Manchester City chairman walking a tightrope over Premier League charges

Manchester City chairman Khaldoon al-Mubarak embodies Abu Dhabi's complex effort to establish itself as a secure and dominant world power within the United Arab Emirates. He has been a pivotal figure at the English club for more than a decade, but the aggressive stance he has taken against the Premier League over financial charges has opened a scenario few would have imagined: the possible sale of Manchester City if the appeal goes against the emirate's interests.

• Khaldoon al-Mubarak has driven Manchester City's confrontational approach toward football authorities.
• Losing the appeal could lead Abu Dhabi to arrange the club's sale to avoid further reputational damage.
• Analysts believe the misstep came from poor legal advice and a misreading of British politics.
• Abu Dhabi's major investments in the UK, including renewable energy, are not expected to be affected.

Who is Khaldoon al-Mubarak, Abu Dhabi's man at Manchester City

Al-Mubarak occupies a unique position in understanding Abu Dhabi's foreign policy. His paternal grandfather, Ahmad Bin Abdul Aziz al-Mubarak, chaired Abu Dhabi's Sharia judicial department and served as a senior adviser to Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the UAE's founding president. He is regarded as one of the architects behind the new nation's Islamic legal framework during the 1970s.

Khaldoon's father, ambassador Khalifa Ahmed Abdel Aziz al-Mubarak, was assassinated in Paris on 9 February 1984, when his son was only eight years old. A group led by Abu Nidal claimed responsibility, accusing the UAE of being too closely aligned with the West and with American interests. Both the grandfather and the father have streets named after them in Abu Dhabi, and the ambassador is remembered as a martyr of the state.

Al-Mubarak's influence across Emirati diplomacy

The current Manchester City chairman has inherited a strategic position within the Abu Dhabi court. After graduating from Tufts University in Massachusetts, he began working for Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed al-Nahyan, now president of the UAE and ruler of Abu Dhabi. The bond is so strong that, according to several sources, the royal family has treated him almost like an adopted son since his father's murder.

His responsibilities extend well beyond football. Al-Mubarak is seen as the emirate's main liaison for British, Chinese and American affairs, and he holds diplomatic immunity in the UK. That triple role makes him one of the most important figures in Abu Dhabi's power structure, far beyond the boundaries of the Etihad Stadium.

Manchester City's confrontational approach to the Premier League

Manchester City's aggressive posture toward European football authorities was not a spontaneous decision. According to documents revealed by the club's lawyer Simon Cliff, it was al-Mubarak himself who dictated the confrontational line. In 2014, when City faced their first UEFA case, the chairman reportedly said he would rather spend £30m on the 50 best lawyers in the world and sue for the next ten years than accept a financial penalty.

On that occasion, the club backed down and reached a settlement with UEFA involving a modest fine and minor transfer restrictions, in an agreement shared with Paris Saint-Germain. The difference is that the Qatari club accepted its punishment, built closer ties with UEFA and developed an admired sporting project in Europe. City, by contrast, kept fighting. Al-Mubarak appears to have broken a basic rule of diplomacy: never embarrass your boss. If the club loses its appeal against the independent commission that found it guilty of multiple financial breaches, Abu Dhabi could order him to arrange the sale.

Khaldoon says he would rather spend £30m on the 50 best lawyers in the world and sue UEFA for the next ten years than settle for a financial penalty.

Selling Manchester City: a quiet exit to protect the royal family

The idea that Abu Dhabi could sell Manchester City is not far-fetched among Gulf analysts. Christopher Davidson, author of Abu Dhabi, Oil and Beyond, says the emirate has no reason to stay and rebuild a damaged reputation. He even claims that sources close to Emirati power circles have confirmed to him that a sale will happen if the appeal fails.

For Davidson, the appeal process will simply be exhausted because there is nothing to lose. After that, the priority will be to exit before the owners are declared unfit, a far worse outcome. Abu Dhabi's smartest advisers would recommend a discreet withdrawal, because the longer they remain in the game, the greater the damage and the more the soft power the emirate had accumulated will unravel.

Abu Dhabi's UK investments are not at risk

Despite a possible farewell to Manchester City, the economic ties between Abu Dhabi and the UK go far beyond football. Large parts of the Emirati state economy operate outside al-Mubarak's remit. Masdar, chaired by Sultan al-Jaber, has made significant investments in renewable energy and wind farms in Scotland. Those operations do not depend on the management of the English club.

There is also the International Holding Company, chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan, brother of the UAE president and of Sheikh Mansour. The group has major interests in biotechnology, shipping, healthcare and hospitality in the UK, including the Ivy restaurant chain. It is inconceivable that those investments would be withdrawn over the City case.

In May this year, the UK signed a free trade agreement with six Gulf countries, including the UAE, which could be worth around £3.7bn a year to the British economy. The emirate was a driving force behind that deal, and according to Davidson there is no chance that it will be affected by the outcome of the football dispute.

A miscalculation without fatal consequences for al-Mubarak

Al-Mubarak is likely to emerge from this episode largely untarnished. Manchester City represents only a small part of his portfolio, and it is unrealistic to think he could control every detail of such a vast empire. The errors point more to the layers below him: the legal advice given to senior Emirati figures was not up to the task.

There was a misreading of British politics and of how the Premier League works as a rules-based institution. Statements such as the one claiming clubs like City are not for sale were, according to Davidson, the product of poor advice given to al-Mubarak himself and ultimately to Sheikh Mansour. For the UK, City is a relevant project, but for Abu Dhabi it has always been a peripheral piece within a much broader power strategy.